We show how to find sufficiently small integer solutions to a polynomial in a single variable modulo N , and to a polynomial in two variables over the integers. The methods sometimes extend to more variables. As applications: RSA encryption with exponent 3 is vulnerable if the opponent knows two-thirds of the message, or if two messages agree over eight-ninths of their length; and we can find the factors of N = P Q if we are given the high order 1 4 log 2 N bits of P.
Introduction
It is easy to compute the integer roots of a polynomial in a single variable over the integers p(x) = 0.
But two related problems can be hard:
(1) finding integer roots of a modular polynomial in one variable:
(2) finding integer roots of a polynomial in several variables:
p(x, y) = 0.
In this paper we restrict these problems to the case where there exists a solution small enough (with respect to N or to the coefficients of p), and we can solve the problems in these special cases, using lattice basis reduction techniques.
Let N be a large composite integer of unknown factorization. Let We will find an integer solution (x 0 , y 0 ) satisfying p(x 0 , y 0 ) = 0 if one exists with |x 0 | ≤ X, |y 0 | ≤ Y , provided
The techniques used in the two cases are similar. We use the coefficients of the polynomial p to build a matrix M, whose rows give the basis of an integer lattice. We will consider a row vector r whose entries are powers of the desired solutions: x i 0 or x i 0 y j 0 . The vector s = rM will be a relatively short lattice element. Using lattice basis reduction techniques such as those due to Lovász [9] to analyze M, we find a hyperplane containing all the short lattice elements. The equation of this hyperplane translates to a linear relation on the elements of r, and then to a polynomial equation c(x 0 ) = 0 or c(x 0 , y 0 ) = 0 over Z. In the univariate modular case we solve c(x 0 ) = 0 directly for x 0 . In the bivariate integer case we combine c(x 0 , y 0 ) with p(x 0 , y 0 ) and solve.
An important application of the univariate modular case is to RSA encryption [12] with small exponent, when most of the message is fixed or "stereotyped." Suppose the plaintext m consists of two pieces, a known piece B and an unknown piece x: m = B + x. Suppose m is RSA-encrypted with an exponent of 3, so the ciphertext c is given by c = m 3 = (B + x) 3 (mod N ). If we know B, c, and N , we can apply the present results to the modular polynomial equation
and recover x as long as |x| < N 1/3 , that is, x has fewer than one-third of the bits of the message, and these bits are consecutive.
A second application of the univariate modular case to RSA encryption with small exponent concerns random padding. Suppose a message m is padded with a random value r 1 before encrypting with exponent 3, giving the ciphertext
Suppose m is encrypted again with different random padding:
We will show how to recover m from c 1 , c 2 , N , as long as the random padding r i is less than one-ninth of the bits of N . This is completely different from Hastad's [7] attack on low-exponent RSA; he used encryptions under several different moduli, and we use only one modulus. The bivariate integer case can be applied to the problem of factoring an integer when we know its high-order bits. If we know N = P Q and we know the high-order 1 4 log 2 N bits of P, then by solving the equation (P 0 + x)(Q 0 + y) − N over a suitable range of x and y we can find the factorization of N . By comparison, Rivest and Shamir [13] need about 1 3 log 2 N bits of P, and a recent work of the present author [4] required 3 10 log 2 N bits. This has applications to some RSA-based cryptographic schemes; see, for example, Vanstone and Zuccherato [15] .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we recall the necessary facts about lattice basis reduction. In Section 3 we present a heuristic approach, which does not quite work, but whose ideas will be refined in the present work. For the univariate modular case, we show in Section 4 how to build the matrix M, the rows of which generate our lattice. In Section 5 we analyze the determinant of this matrix, and compare to the length of the relevant vector. We complete the solution of the modular univariate polynomial in Section 6. Applications to RSA encryption with low exponent and partial information are given in Section 7 (where most of a message is known beforehand) and Section 8 (where two messages agree over most of their length). In Section 10 we develop the bivariate integer case, and apply it in Section 11 to the problem of factoring integers with partial information. Section 12 investigates the extension of these results to two or more variables modulo N or three or more variables over the integers. We give concluding remarks and an open problem in Section 13. This paper, containing material from the author's papers [2] and [3] , grew out of the joint work with Franklin, Patarin, and Reiter [5] , which in turn was inspired Franklin and Reiter's Crypto '95 rump session talk [6] .
Lattice Basis Reduction
We recall here some basic facts about lattice basis reduction. The reader is referred to [9] for further information.
Suppose M is a square n × n matrix with rational entries and with full rank. The rows of M generate a lattice L, a collection of vectors closed under addition and subtraction; in fact the rows form a basis of L.
From [9] we learn how to compute a reduced basis (b 1 , b 2 , . . . , b n ) for L. The matrix B with rows b i is related to M by a series of elementary row operations; equivalently, B = K M where K is an invertible matrix, and both K and K −1 have integer entries. The computation of B is done in time polynomial in n and in log(max{|n i j |, |d i j |}), where n i j and d i j are the numerator and denominator of the matrix element M i, j in lowest terms.
Remark. Lattice reduction works more efficiently with integer entries, but our lattice is easier to describe with rational entries. Converting between the two is not difficult.
The basis elements b i are relatively short. The Euclidean norm |b 1 | is within a multiplicative factor of 2 (n−1)/2 of the norm of the smallest nonzero lattice element, and similar estimates hold for the other
The first inequality is Hadamard's inequality. The second is a property of the reduced basis; see [9, In our applications, we are not necessarily looking for the shortest nonzero vector in the lattice, but for a relatively short vector, and Lemma 1 serves to confine all such short vectors to a hyperplane. Lemma 2 generalizes this concept from a hyperplane to a subspace of smaller dimension.
Lemma 2.
If a lattice element s satisfies |s| < |b * i | for all i = k + 1, . . . , n, then s lies in the space spanned by b 1 , b 2 , . . . , b k . Lemma 2 will be useful when we wish to develop more than one equation. This will be necessary when solving a modular polynomial with more than one variable, or an integer polynomial with more than two variables. See Section 12.
Motivation
Lattice reduction techniques seem inherently linear. It is not immediately obvious how to apply these techniques to the nonlinear problem of solving polynomial equations.
To motivate the present work, we start with a heuristic approach to solving a modular polynomial equation by lattice basis reduction techniques. This approach does not quite work, but it gives ideas upon which we can build the algorithms which do work.
Given a monic univariate modular polynomial equation
to which we wish to find a small root x 0 , we could proceed as follows: Establish a suitable upper bound X on the size of the desired root x 0 . Build a (δ + 2) × (δ + 2) matrix M, with diagonal elements given by 1, X −1 , X −2 , . . . , X −δ , N, and with right-hand column p 0 , p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p δ−1 , p δ = 1, N; all other entries are 0.
Suppose p(x 0 ) = y 0 N for unknown integers x 0 and y 0 with |x 0 | < X . Consider the row vector r consisting of powers of x 0 and y 0 :
Consider the row vector
Its last element is p(x 0 ) − y 0 N = 0. The vector s is an element of the lattice spanned by the rows of M. Its Euclidean norm is bounded by √ δ + 1 since each entry (x 0 / X ) i is bounded by 1. If s is among the shorter vectors of this lattice, we might find it by lattice basis reduction techniques.
From the discussion in Section 2, we need to compare |s| to the δ + 2 root of the determinant of the matrix M. If
then s will be among the shorter vectors, and the lattice basis reduction techniques might find it. (For the present discussion we ignore factors like 2 −(n−1)/4 dependent only on the size of the matrix. We will take account of them later.)
We can easily evaluate det(M) because M is upper triangular:
Ignoring factors like 2 −(n−1)/4 and δ + 1, we require roughly that det(M) > 1, and so we require roughly that X (δ 2 +δ)/2 < N, X < N 2/(δ quite a small bound on X , especially for moderately large values of δ. By contrast, the present paper will develop a more reasonable bound of (roughly)
One problem with this heuristic approach is that, although the entries r i of the vector r are supposed to represent powers of x 0 , there is no way (within the lattice structure) to enforce that relationship, for example, to enforce the requirement r i+1 /r i = r j+1 /r j .
A second, related, problem is that we have many unknowns r i and only one relation p(x 0 ) = y 0 N . Each unknown r i contributes a factor X −i to det(M), and the lone relation p(x 0 ) = y 0 N contributes a factor N . The resulting imbalance, and the requirement det(M) > 1, lead to the stringent requirement X δ(δ+1)/2 < N . In the new approach we will work with several relations: for example,
. This allows us to reuse the unknowns r i and amortize their "cost" over the several relations. Each relation, meanwhile, contributes a factor of N j to det(M). Because det(M) now contains several powers of N , the requirement det(M) > 1 translates to a much looser requirement on X .
The fact that the equations
hold mod N j (rather than just mod N ) improves this situation, by contributing larger powers of N to det(M). Using only equations of the form x i p(x) = 0 (mod N ), we could find solutions x 0 up to about X = N 1/(2δ−1) . With the additional equations
, we are able to improve this bound to X = N 1/δ . Notice that the r i satisfy several equations that differ only by shifts in the powers of
The present approach allows us to recapture the flavor of the requirement that the various r i should be related by (for example) r 3 /r 2 = r 4 /r 3 , since the roles played by r 3 and r 2 in the first equation are the same as the roles played by r 4 and r 3 in the second equation. This is offered only as an intuitive explanation for the success of the present approach; it will not be used in the technical discussions that follow.
The use of Lemma 1 allows a qualitative innovation in the application of lattice basis reduction techniques, which may be of interest in its own right. We can state with certainty that the present algorithm will find all sufficiently small solutions, in all cases; by contrast, many applications of lattice basis reduction techniques can only be guaranteed to work in a large proportion of problem instances. By looking at the last element of the reduced basis (rather than the first), we can confine all sufficiently short lattice elements to a hyperplane whose equation we compute. In particular, the relatively short vector s, corresponding to the desired solution, lies in this hyperplane. The equation of that hyperplane, together with the interpretation r i = x i 0 , gives a polynomial equation which x 0 is guaranteed to satisfy. This guarantee is a new aspect of the present work.
Building the Matrix: Univariate Modular Case
In this section we show how to build the appropriate lattice for the case of a univariate modular polynomial. N is a large composite integer of unknown factorization. We are given the polynomial
which we assume to be monic, that is, p δ = 1. Suppose there is an integer x 0 satisfying
2 for some ε > 0. We wish to find x 0 .
Begin by selecting an integer
The first condition ensures that
The second condition ensures that hδ ≥ 7. For each pair of integers i, j satisfying 0 ≤ i < δ, 1 ≤ j < h, we define the polynomial
For the desired solution x 0 we know that p(x 0 ) = y 0 N for some integer y 0 , so that
We will build a rational matrix M of size (2hδ − δ) × (2hδ − δ), using the coefficients of the polynomials q i j (x), in such a way that an integer linear combination of the rows of M corresponding to powers of x and y will give a vector with relatively small Euclidean norm. Multiplying by least common denominator will produce an integer matrix on which lattice basis reduction can be applied.
The matrix M is broken into blocks. The upper right block, of size (hδ) × (hδ − δ), has rows indexed by the integer g with 0 ≤ g < hδ, and columns indexed by γ (i, j) = hδ + i + ( j − 1)δ with 0 ≤ i < δ and 1 ≤ j < h, so that hδ ≤ γ (i, j) < 2hδ − δ. The entry at (g, γ (i, j)) is the coefficient of x g in the polynomial q i j (x). The lower right (hδ − δ) × (hδ − δ) block is a diagonal matrix, with the value N j in each column γ (i, j).
The upper left (hδ)×(hδ) block is a diagonal matrix, whose value in row g is a rational
is an upper bound to the solutions |x| of interest.
The lower left (hδ − δ) × (hδ) block is zero. We illustrate the matrix M in the case h = 3, δ = 2. Assume that p(
The rows of M span a lattice. Of interest to us is one vector s in that lattice, related to the unknown solution x 0 . Consider a row vector r whose left-hand elements are powers of x 0 :
0 , and whose right-hand elements are the negatives of powers of x 0 and y 0 :
The product s = rM is a row vector with left-hand elements given by
and right-hand elements by
The Euclidean norm of s is estimated by
Because the right-hand elements hδ − δ of the desired vector s are 0, we can restrict our attention to the sublatticeM of M consisting of points with right-hand elements 0, namely M ∩ (R hδ × {0} hδ−δ ). To do this computationally, we take advantage of the fact that p(x) and hence q i j (x) are monic polynomials, so that certain hδ − δ rows of the upper right block of M form an upper triangular matrix with 1 on the diagonal. This implies that we can do elementary row operations on M to produce a block matrix M whose lower-right (hδ − δ) × (hδ − δ) block is the identity and whose upper-right (hδ) × (hδ − δ) block is zero.
The upper-left (hδ) × (hδ) blockM ofM represents the desired sublattice: an hδ-dimensional lattice, of which s is one relatively short element.
Analysis of the Determinant
M is an upper triangular matrix, so its determinant is just the product of the diagonal elements:
By construction,
We will be invoking Lemma 1 on the smaller matrixM, whose dimension is n = hδ. Since we know
So the hypothesis of Lemma 1 will hold if
By our choice of h we have hδ ≥ 7, so that (by a computation)
Also by our choice of h we know
we will have
as required.
Finishing the Solution
Now we can tie the pieces together. Apply a lattice basis reduction routine to the row basis of the matrixM, producing a basis
where, as before, n = hδ = dim(M). By the calculation in the previous section, we have
By Lemma 1, any vector in the lattice generated by the rows ofM with length less than 1 must lie in the hyperplane spanned by
In terms of the larger matrix M and the vectors r, s with rM = s, there is an hδ-dimensional space of vectors r such that rM = s has 0's in its right-hand hδ − δ entries. By Lemma 1, those integer vectors r which additionally satisfy |s| < 1 must lie in a space of dimension one smaller, namely dimension hδ − 1. This gives rise to a linear equation on the entries r g , 0 ≤ g < hδ. That is, we compute coefficients c g , not all zero, such that:
For any integer vector r = (r g , r γ (i, j) ) such that s = rM has right-hand entries 0 and |s| < 1, we must have
This holds for all short vectors s in the lattice with right-hand side 0. In particular, it holds for the vector obtained from r where
Thus we have computed coefficients c g of a polynomial C(x) such that the small solution x 0 satisfies
. This is a polynomial equation holding in Z, not just modulo N . We can solve this polynomial for x 0 easily, using known techniques for solving univariate polynomial equations over Z. (The Sturm sequence [14] will suffice.) Thus we have produced the desired solution x 0 .
Remark. If there are several short solutions x 0 , this procedure will find all of them simultaneously. All will be roots of the polynomial
We have proved: 
Proof. The lattice basis reduction step operated on a matrix of size hδ = O(δ/ε), and the matrix entries are not too large. By [9] this step is done in polynomial time. The rest of the algorithm is also polynomial time. 
Corollary 1. With the hypothesis of Theorem 1, except that
X ≤ N 1/δ , then in time polynomial in (log N , 2 δ ), we can find all integers x 0 such that p(x 0 ) = 0 (mod N ) and |x 0 | ≤ X.
Application: Stereotyped Messages
An important application of the univariate modular case is to RSA encryption [12] with small exponent, when most of the message is fixed or "stereotyped." Suppose the plaintext m consists of two pieces:
(1) A known piece B = 2 k b, such as the ASCII representation of "October 19, 1995. The secret key for the day is." (2) An unknown piece x, such as "Squeamish Ossifrage," whose length is less than one-third the length of N .
Suppose this is RSA-encrypted with an exponent of 3, so the ciphertext c is given by c = m
If we know B, c and N , we can apply the present results to the polynomial p(x) = (B + x) 3 − c, and recover x 0 satisfying
as long as such an x 0 exists with |x 0 | < N 1/3 , that is, the length of x 0 is less than one-third of the length of N . This is obvious when B = 0: if the plaintext is just x 0 < N 1/3 , then x 3 0 < N , and the ciphertext is c = x 3 0 as integers, so that we could recover x 0 = c 1/3 by taking the integer cube root. But the present paper makes it possible for nonzero B as well.
Remark. The bound X on recoverable values x 0 depends on the modulus N . If x 0 has 250 bits and N has 512 bits, and an RSA exponent of 3 is used, the present techniques fail to recover x 0 because x 0 > N 1/3 . But if we upgrade to a 1024-bit modulus N while keeping the unknown x 0 at 250 bits, these x 0 are now vulnerable to attack because
The attack works equally well if the unknown x 0 lies in the most significant bits of the message m rather than the least significant bits-we are just multiplying x by a known constant 2
k . An interesting variant occurs when the unknown x is split between two blocks: "TODAY'S KEY IS swordfish AND THE PASSWORD IS joe."
We can view this as two unknowns: x = "swordfish" and y = "joe," and one known piece B = "TODAY'S KEY IS ---AND THE PASSWORD IS -," presuming that we know (or correctly guess) the lengths of x and y. The plaintext message is
and the polynomial which we wish to solve is
with a solution (x 0 , y 0 ) suitably bounded. We defer consideration of this case until Section 12.
Application to RSA with Random Padding: Two Messages
To introduce the second application (which was actually the starting point of the present investigation), we recall the recent result of Franklin and Reiter [6] . Suppose two messages m and m satisfy a known affine relation, say
with r known. Suppose we know the RSA-encryptions of the two messages with an exponent of 3:
Then
What if we do not know the exact relation between m and m , but we do know that r is small, say
Can we still find m? One can imagine a protocol in which messages M are subjected to random padding before being RSA-encrypted with an exponent of 3. Perhaps M is left-shifted by k bits, and a random k-bit quantity R is added, to form a plaintext m; the ciphertext c is then the cube of m (mod N ):
Now suppose the same unknown message M is encrypted twice, but with a different random pad each time. Let the second random pad be R = R + r so that the second plaintext is m = m + r . Then we see the two ciphertexts
Can we recover r and m, given knowledge of c, c , and N ? We can eliminate m from the two equations above by taking their resultant:
This is a univariate polynomial in r of degree 9 (mod N ). If its solution r satisfies |r | < N 1/9 , we can apply the present work to recover r . We can then apply Franklin and Reiter's result to recover m, and strip off the padding to get M.
As before, this works just as well if the padding goes in the high-order bits, or in the middle; just divide each plaintext by the appropriate power of 2 to move the random bits to the low-order bits.
The warning is clear: If the message is subject to random padding of length less than one-ninth the length of N , and then encrypted with an exponent of 3, multiple encryptions of the same message will reveal the message.
Notice that for a 1024-bit RSA key, this attack tolerates 100 bits of padding fairly easily.
Some possible steps to avoid this attack.
(1) Randomize the message in other ways; for example, by the methods of Bellare and Rogaway [1] . This spreads the randomization throughout the message in a nonlinear manner, and completely blocks the present attack.
(2) Spread the random padding into several blocks (not one contiguous block). Then the present attack needs to be modified. The padding could be two small blocks r and s, positioned so that the encryption is c = (2 l r + 2 k m + s) 3 (mod N ). Two encryptions of the same message would yield a resultant which is a single equation in two small integer variables r and s. The generalized attack of Section 12 might work, provided that |r | and |s| are subject to bounds R and S with RS < N 1/9 . The computation is more complicated and results are not guaranteed.
(3) Spread the padding throughout the message: two bits out of each eight-bit byte, for example. This seems to be a much more effective defense against the present attack.
(4) Increase the amount of padding. This decreases efficiency; also if the padding is less than one-sixth the length of N , an alternate solution shown in Appendix 1 might still recover the message if multiple encryptions have been done.
(5) Make the "random" padding depend on the message deterministically. For example, we could subject the message to a hashing function, and append that hash value as the random padding. Then two encryptions would be identical, because the random padding would be identical. A possible weakness still exists: suppose a time-stamp is included in each message, and this time-stamp occupies the low-order bits, next to the padding. Then two plaintexts for the same message (with different time stamps) will differ in the time-stamp and the pad; just let r combine these two fields and proceed as before.
(6) Use larger exponents for RSA encryption. If the exponent is e, the attack apparently tolerates random padding of length up to 1/e 2 times the length of N . So already for e = 7 the attack is useless: on a 1024-bit RSA key with e = 7, the attack would tolerate only 21 bits of padding, and this would be better treated by exhaustion.
RSA Signatures
The present work does not not show any weaknesses in the RSA signature scheme with a small validating exponent. For example, using the exponent e = 3, and using several related messages m i = m 0 + i, i = 0, 1, 2, . . . , 100, the knowledge of signatures m 
Bivariate Integer Case
We consider next the case of a single polynomial equation in two variables over the integers (not mod N ):
for which we wish to find small integer solutions (x 0 , y 0 ). We assume that p(x, y) has maximum degree δ in each variable separately, and that p(x, y) is irreducible over the integers. In particular, its coefficients are relatively prime as a set. The basic outline is the same as before. We create several polynomials
satisfied by the desired solution (x 0 , y 0 ), and build from these a matrix M representing a lattice. There will be a sublattice, represented by a smaller matrixM, corresponding to vectors with right-hand side equal to 0. One vector r with entries r gh = x g 0 y h 0 will give rise to a short vector s = rM in the sublattice. By lattice basis reduction techniques we confine all such short vectors to a hyperplane, whose equation, c gh r gh = 0, for our special vector r, translates to a polynomial equation on x 0 and y 0 :
We will see that C(x, y) is not a multiple of p(x, y), so that since p is irreducible, the resultant of C and p gives us enough information to find (x 0 , y 0 ). There are some technical differences between this bivariate integer case and the earlier univariate modular case.
In the modular case, we expressed the bound X in terms of the modulus N and the degree of p. Here, instead of N , we express bounds X and Y in terms of the coefficients of p. Define a polynomialp(x, y) = p(x X, yY ), so thatp i j = p i j X i Y j . Define W = max i j |p i j | as the largest possible term in p(x, y) in the region of interest. Then we will find a solution (x 0 , y 0 ) bounded in absolute values by (X, Y ) (if one exists) provided that
The matrices M 1 andM are rectangular rather than square, so that we are dealing with a k-dimensional lattice in Z n with k < n. The lattice basis reduction routines handle this easily enough, but the quantity analogous to det(M) is harder to analyze in this case.
A minor difference is that we use polynomials q i j (x, y) = x i y j p(x, y) rather than q i jk (x, y) = x i y j p(x, y) k to build our matrix M. It turns out that using powers of p would not help us, because we no longer gain the advantage that came from introducing moduli N j instead of N . We begin by selecting an integer k > 2/(3ε). For all pairs of integers (i, j) with 0 ≤ i < k and 0 ≤ j < k, form the polynomial
2 + k 2 columns, the left-hand columns indexed by γ (g, h) and the right-hand columns indexed by β(i, j) = (k + δ) 2 + ki + j with 0 ≤ i, j < k. The left-hand block is a diagonal matrix whose (γ (g, h), γ (g, h)) entry is given by X −g Y −h . The (γ (g, h), β(i, j)) entry of the right-hand block is the coefficient of x g y h in the polynomial q i j (x, y).
Perform elementary row operations on M 1 to produce a matrix M 2 whose right-hand block has the k 2 × k 2 identity matrix on the bottom and the (2kδ + δ 2 ) × k 2 zero matrix on the top. We can do this because the greatest common divisor of the coefficients of p is 1 (p being irreducible). The lattice formed by these top (2kδ + δ 2 ) rows of M 2 is the sublattice of the original lattice obtained by setting to 0 all the right-hand columns. Now do lattice basis reduction on the top 2kδ +δ 2 rows of M 2 ; let the resulting 2kδ +δ 
Because its right-hand side is 0, s is one of the vectors in the row lattice spanned by M 3 . We will show that it is a "relatively short" vector in the lattice. To do this, we need to estimate the sizes of the other vectors in M 3 .
To that end, let 
The right-hand columns are all shifted versions of one fixed column vector v, representing the coefficients of the polynomialp(x, y), namely
The largest element of each has absolute value W . These columns are selected columns of a Toeplitz matrix. A lemma, whose proof is given in Appendix 2, says that these columns are nearly orthogonal. The lemma finds a k 2 ×k 2 matrix of the right-hand block of M 4 with large determinant. Select 2kδ + δ 2 columns of the left-hand block of M 4 (the identity matrix) to extend
Lemma 3. There is a k
Now 2 T = T 3 where 3 is a diagonal matrix differing from 2 by the deletion of K 1's on the diagonal, so that
We compute the determinants of i :
Remark. Much cancellation goes on between det( 1 ) and det ( 2 ): all the factors X i Y j with 0 ≤ i < k and 0 ≤ j < k are cancelled, leaving only those factors
Thus the shape of the boundary of the region of applicable (g, h) is important, and must be considered when designing the algorithm.
Multiplying the two determinants, we get
and since
we obtain
Let this lower bound be called E. M 3 T is obtained from M 1 T by elementary row operations, so
The row sT in M 3 T obtained from s by deleting columns has Euclidean length bounded by that of s:
M 3 T has a block lower triangular structure, with a k 2 × k 2 identity matrix in the lower right. LetM denote the upper-left block of M 3 T , with dimension 2kδ + δ 2 on each side. We have
We wish to apply Lemma 1 toM and sT , with n = 2kδ + δ 2 . If we can guarantee
as required by Lemma 1. This requirement translates to
and omitting some tedious computations, we translate the requirement to
The rest of the construction proceeds as before. Assume XY satisfies this bound. Then from Lemma 1, applying lattice basis reduction toM will produce a hyperplane containing all lattice vectors as short as sT . The equation of this hyperplane, and the construction of s, yield the polynomial equation
Further, C(x, y) is not a multiple of p(x, y), since all the multiples of p(x, y) of sufficiently low degree were already used to define the sublatticeM. Since p(x, y) is irreducible,
gives a nontrivial integer polynomial. We can easily compute its roots, which include x 0 . Finally, given x 0 , we can easily find those y solving p(x 0 , y) = 0. Tying this all together, we have: Proof. The lattice basis reduction step operated on a matrix of size 2kδ + δ 2 , where k = O(1/ε). By [9] this step is done in polynomial time. The rest of the algorithm is also polynomial time.
Corollary 2. With the hypothesis of Theorem 2, except that
, we can find all integer pairs (x 0 , y 0 ) with p(x 0 , y 0 ) = 0, |x 0 | ≤ X, and |y 0 | ≤ Y .
Proof. Set ε = 1/log W , and do exhaustive search on the high-order O(δ) unknown bits of x. The running time is still polynomial, but of higher degree in (log W ).
Remark. Theorem 2 was developed for the case where p had degree δ independently in each variable. If the set of indices of nonzero coefficients of p (that is, its Newton polygon) has a different shape, it is useful to select the indices of the polynomials q i j (x, y) and monomials x g y h in a different manner. The shape of the region of allowable monomials (g, h), and in particular its boundary, interacts with the shape of the Newton polygon of p in determining the efficiency of the algorithm.
Theorem 3.
With the hypothesis of Theorem 2, except that p has total degree δ, the appropriate bound is
Proof (Sketch). We use polynomials q i j = x i y j p(x, y) where i + j < k (rather than i < k and j < k independently as before). The set of indices (i, j) now forms a triangle rather than a square. The relevant determinant is now
Solve for XY to get
where ε = O(1/k). As in Corollary 2, set ε = 1/log W and exhaust on high-order bits while maintaining polynomial time.
Remark. This shows how the shape of the region of indices (g, h) of monomials, and particularly the boundary of that shape, affects the outcome. Theorem 3 is better than Theorem 2 if p is a general polynomial of total degree δ, but Theorem 2 is better if p has degree δ in each variable independently. As another example, if p(x, y) has degree G in x and H in y (independently), then for any positive parameter α we can tolerate ranges X and Y satisfying
by allowing 0 ≤ i ≤ kα and 0 ≤ j ≤ k.
Factoring with High Bits Known
We can apply the present techniques to the problem of factoring an integer when we know the high-order bits of one of the factors. Suppose we know N = P Q and we know the high-order 1 4 log 2 N bits of P. By division we know the high-order 1 4 log 2 N bits of Q as well. We write
where P 0 and Q 0 are known, while P, Q, x 0 , and y 0 are unknown. Define the bounds X and Y on the unknowns x 0 and y 0 by
Define the polynomial
where x and y are dummy variables. One integer solution of p(x, y) = 0 is given by the desired (x 0 , y 0 ), namely,
We have δ = 1, and the quantity W is given by
An easy computation gives
so that the hypothesis of Corollary 2 is satisfied. Thus we have:
In polynomial time we can find the factorization of N = P Q if we know the high-order ( 1 4 log 2 N ) bits of P.
By comparison, Rivest and Shamir [13] need about ( 1 3 log 2 N ) bits of P, and a recent paper by the present author [4] used a lattice-based method (less efficient than that of this paper) to factor N using ( 3 10 log 2 N ) bits of P. Theorem 4 has applications to some RSA-based cryptographic schemes. For example, Vanstone and Zuccherato [15] design an ID-based RSA encryption scheme, where a person's identity is encoded in his RSA modulus N = P Q. In one variant of the scheme (Section 3.1 of [15] ), a 1024-bit N is created by specifying (in a public manner) the high-order 512 − 248 = 264 bits of P and hence of Q. By the present techniques, this is enough information to allow the attacker to factor N .
If we know the low-order bits of P instead of the high-order bits, we get the same results, but a twist in the proof is worth noticing.
Theorem 5.
In polynomial time we can find the factorization of N = P Q if we know the low-order ( 1 4 log 2 N ) bits of P.
where P 0 and Q 0 are known, while P, Q, x 0 , and y 0 are unknown. Iterate over possible values of = log 2 (P) , and define bounds X and Y by
so that (x 0 , y 0 ) is a root of the equation
The term (P 0 Q 0 − N )/2 k is an integer by construction. We needed to define p(x, y) as above, rather than the apparent choice
because the coefficients of p all have the common factor 2 k , so that p would be reducible over Z, namely, p = 2 k × p, violating the hypothesis of Theorem 2. In particular, the construction in Section 10 would fail when we tried to create matrix M 2 from M 1 .
The rest of the proof continues as before, with XY = O(N 1/2 ) and W = (N 3/4 ). (The fact that XY differs from W 2/3 by a constant multiple merely means that we have to do some trial and error.)
Extension to More Variables
Suppose we have a polynomial p(x, y, z) in three variables over the integers. (The following remarks, suitably adapted, will also apply to a polynomial p(x, y) in two variables modulo N .)
We could try to mimic the present approach. If the ranges X, Y, Z are small enough, we will end up with a polynomial relation C(x, y, z) , not a multiple of p, which is satisfied by (x 0 , y 0 , z 0 ). Then the resultant of p(x, y, z) and C(x, y, z) with respect to z will give a polynomial r (x, y) in two variables. We can then try to solve r (x, y) = 0 by the current methods. But the degree of r (x, y) will be quite high, so that the ranges X and Y which can be tolerated will be quite small.
A much more promising approach, which works often but not always, is as follows. If the ranges X, Y, Z are small enough, we are guaranteed to find a space of codimension 1 (a hyperplane) containing all the short vectors of the latticeM. But we might easily find a space of larger codimension. (There is a good possibility that for many basis vectors b i the orthogonal component |b * i | exceeds our known upper bound on |s|, and each one increases the codimension of the space containing all the short vectors.) We develop several polynomial equations C i (x, y, z) satisfying C i (x 0 , y 0 , z 0 ) = 0; the number of such equations is equal to the codimension of this space. We can then take resultants and g.c.d.s of the various C i (x, y, z) and p(x, y, z) and hope to produce a single polynomial equation in a single variable r (x) = 0, which we solve over the reals. This is only a heuristic approach, which might or might not work for a given polynomial p. One potential obstacle is that we might not obtain enough equations C i (x, y, z) = 0. A related concern is that the equations we obtain might be redundant: for example, we might have C 1 (x, y, z) = xC 2 (x, y, z). We see no way to guarantee that we will gather enough independent equations to enable a solution.
Indeed, certain counterexamples show that this procedure must fail for some polynomials. In the case p(x, y) = 0 (mod N ), we adapt an example of Manders and Adleman [10] . Let n = q 1 q 2 . . . q m be the product of the first m odd primes. Then log n ≈ m log m. Also the modular equation x 2 = 1 (mod n) has 2 m solutions. Let N = n h for a sufficiently large integer h. Look for solutions to
There are at least 2 m+1 pairs (x 0 , y 0 ) satisfying these equations. We cannot hope to produce them all in time polynomial in log N . And yet we can arrange that any criterion
such as the hypothesis of Theorem 1 can be satisfied by proper choice of h > 2/ε. If faced with this problem, our algorithm will probably return the equation
(moving it from a modular equation to an integer equation), but then be unable to proceed further (if we maintain X = n) because the appropriate bounds XY < W c or X < n c are not satisfied. If we allow X = n 1/2 it may still be able to proceed, but we will not have exponentially many solutions in this case.
However, we need not overemphasize the negative. The extended algorithm will often work, even in cases when it is not guaranteed.
An important application of the extended algorithm was alluded to in Section 7. Suppose a plaintext message m, consists of two unknown blocks of bits and a known piece, is subjected to RSA encryption with exponent 3. The message may be: m = "TODAY'S KEY IS swordfish AND THE PASSWORD IS joe."
We can view this as two unknowns: x = "swordfish" and y = "joe," and one known piece, B = "TODAY'S KEY IS ---AND THE PASSWORD IS -."
We presume that we know the lengths of x and y, or can iterate over their possible values.
The plaintext message is
with a solution (x 0 , y 0 ) suitably bounded, and with c, k, B, N known and x, y unknown. The polynomial p(x, y) has total degree 3. We select a bound 3t on the degree of the monomials in our algorithm, so that we have monomials x g y h with g + h < 3t. We introduce polynomial equations
with j ≤ 2, k ≥ 1, and i + j + 3k < 3t. The determinant of the related matrix has powers of N totaling
2 .
The powers of 1/ X come to
as do the powers of 1/Y . So our requirement becomes
with ε ≈ 1/(3t). If this requirement is met we will get at least one equation C(x, y) = 0. We tried an experiment on a scaled-down version of this. Rather than a cubic equation, we used a quadratic equation of the form
We had variables x 0 , y 0 bounded by 2 23 , and a modulus N ≈ 2 150 . We used monomials of total degree bounded by 5, so that there were 21 monomials and ten polynomial equations. The resulting requirement, (XY ) 35 < N 13 , was met handily: 2 1610 < 2 1950 . The matrix was represented as integers, and was scaled in such a way that the desired solution s had Euclidean length about 10 38 . We ran basis reduction on the resulting 21 × 21 matrix. The results were much better than expected: For each i = 2, 3, . . . , 21 we had |b * i | ≈ 10 41 > |s|, while |b 1 | = |s| ≈ 10 38 , so that instead of confining the short vectors to a hyperplane the algorithm actually confined them to a one-dimensional subspace-we could just read off the answer s. The computation time was disappointing though: the lattice basis reduction required 45 hours. Clearly much experimentation needs to be done yet with more optimized lattice basis reduction algorithms.
Conclusion and Open Problem
We have shown algorithms for finding solutions to univariate modular polynomial equations p(x) = 0 (mod N ), and bivariate integer polynomial equations p(x, y) = 0, as long as the solutions are suitably bounded with respect to N or to the coefficients of p, respectively.
We used the coefficients of p to build a lattice containing a short vector based on the unknown solution (x 0 , y 0 ); this need not be the shortest vector. We then used a novel application of lattice basis reduction methods: rather than search for the shortest vector, we confine all relatively short vectors to a hyperplane. The equation of this hyperplane, when applied to our special short vector, gives a polynomial over the integers satisfied by (x 0 , y 0 ), from which the solution follows.
We showed several applications to RSA with small encryption exponent, and to integer factorization with partial knowledge. We believe that other applications will arise. For example, Patarin [11] pointed out that the method of padding a message by repetition: ("Attack at dawn . . . Attack at dawn . . . ") amounts to multiplying a short message (x = "Attack at dawn . . . ") by 2 k + 1. If the message is short enough, and RSA with small exponent is used, the present techniques can derive the message again.
Joye and Quisquater [8] give many other cryptographic applications of the techniques presented here.
The present paper shows several potential exposures concerning RSA with small exponent. Specific implementations of RSA should be examined with regard to these exposures.
Conventional wisdom states that RSA should not be applied directly to messages, but rather that the messages should be randomized in some way prior to encryption, for example, by the methods of Bellare and Rogaway [1] . The results of the present paper give particular reinforcement to this wisdom in the case of small encrypting exponent.
The paper does not show any weaknesses in the RSA signature scheme with a small validating exponent. We hope that lattice basis reduction will find this row. The determinant of M is N 3αC(k,2)+C(k, 3) . This is larger than (N 6α ) C(k,2)+C(k,3) because of our choice of α. So s is among the shorter elements of the lattice generated by the rows of M.
Contrary to the rest of this paper, we actually want to find s, not just confine it to a hyperplane. The difficulty in finding s depends on its rank among the short elements. If |r i | are much smaller than N α , then we can hope that s is the shortest lattice element, and that lattice basis reduction methods can recover it efficiently. We do not here supply efficiency estimates or probabilities of success; we treat this as a heuristic attack.
Assuming that we can actually find s, we will be able to recover the values r i by taking g.c.d. of elements of r = sM and hopefully the latter g.c.d. will be small enough to discover by exhaustive search.
Having found r i , we can recover m by Franklin and Reiter's technique. If we have 14 encryptions of the same message (k = 13), then we can tolerate a random padding of about 150 bits in a 1024-bit RSA message.
Appendix 2. Nearly Orthogonal Toeplitz Columns
In this Appendix we give a proof of the technical result needed in Section 10: that several columns of the matrix M 4 are "nearly orthogonal." A modification of this proof would apply to any Toeplitz matrix. Thus each diagonal entry of M isp cd , and each off-diagonal entry is bounded by |p cd |8 −(g−i) 2 −(h− j) 2 . This implies that M is diagonally dominant, because the absolute values of the off-diagonal entries in its µ(i, j) row sum to at most |p cd |.
Each eigenvalue of M is within 3 4 |p cd | ofp cd , and so exceeds 1 4 |p cd | in absolute value. By choice of (c, d) we know For the second claim of the lemma: If the largest coefficient ofp is eitherp 00 orp δδ , set (c, d) = (a, b) and notice thatM is a triangular matrix whose diagonal entries have absolute value W . If the largest coefficient is eitherp 0δ orp δ0 , redefine the indexing function as µ(i, j) = ki + (k − 1 − j) so that againM is a triangular matrix whose diagonal entries have absolute value W . Similar results hold if (a, b) is any corner of the Newton polygon associated withp.
